Scholars Crossing
Faculty Publications and Presentations

Liberty University School of Law

1-1-2008

Chinese and Western Worldviews: Implications for Law, Policy,
Jeffrey C. Tuomala
Liberty University, jtuomala@liberty.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
International Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Tuomala, Jeffrey C., "Chinese and Western Worldviews: Implications for Law, Policy," (2008). Faculty
Publications and Presentations. 32.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars
Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized
administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

CHINESE AND WESTERN WORLDVIEWS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW, POLICY, AND WAR*

Jeffrey C. Tuomalat

Chinese and Western worldviews differ significantly, with implications for law and policy, particularly in the context of the use of
force in international relations. It is commonly assumed that Chinese
and Western worldviews or cultures each has an essential unity, or has
at least developed on a continuum, over the millennia. That assumption may be sound with regard to the Chinese, but not to the Western
worldview. The Christian West embraces a worldview that differs
fundamentally from that of the pre-Christian West and the postChristian West, which enabled it to develop and sustain the rule of law
unique to the Western legal tradition. Certain fundamental characteristics of the Chinese worldview are remarkably similar to those of the
pre-Christian and post-Christian West, but strikingly different from
those of the Christian West. The true dividing line between philosophical and ethical perspectives does not fall between Chinese and
Western worldviews; it falls between non-Christian and Christian
worldviews. Only a Christian worldview, with its distinctive cosmology and social order, can birth and sustain the rule of law and its correlative distinction between law and policy.
Cosmology1 and social order provide the focal points for comparing and contrasting these two fundamentally distinct and competing
This article is an adaptation of a paper titled "On War and Jnstice: National Interest, International Law and Cooperation in an Age of Terrorism," which
the author presented at a February 2004 conference hosted by the University of Denver's Center for China-United States Cooperation and co-sponsored by the Association for Christian Conferences Teaching and Service. The topic of the conference
was "Chinese and Western Values: Is International Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism Possible?"
t
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Liberty University School of Law. B.S., The Ohio State University, 1973; J.D., Capital University School of Law, 1976; LL.M., George Washington School of Law, 1984. Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Ret.).
1
"Cosmology," as used herein, refers to that branch of philosophy dealing
with the origin and structure of the universe and the relation of God and man in it.
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worldviews. In the Christian West, a basic cosmological dualism
sharply distinguishes between the Creator and His creation. The Christian West is also marked by a multiplicity of social-groups with overlapping and competing jurisdictions. These two characteristics gave
rise to the ideology of the rule of law along with institutions that could
implement it. The Chinese and non-Christian West adhere to a basic
cosmological monism with no clear distinction between the Creator
and His creation. The resulting tendency is to destroy group pluralism
by undermining the multiplicity of political jurisdictions and blurring
the distinctions between political, familial, and religious institutions.
As a consequence, China and the non-Christian West are incapable of
developing or sustaining the particular type of legal order based on the
rule of law that is unique to the Western legal tradition.
Part I of this article briefly considers the uses of the terms "West"
and "Western" and explains why the Christian culture that prevailed in
Western Europe between 400 A.D. and 1800 A.D. must be distinguished from Western societies that preceded and followed that period.
Part II compares and contrasts Chinese and Western worldviews at
the points of cosmology and social order, drawing upon two Western
writers, Augustine and Unger, and three Chinese writers, Zhang, Yao,
and Shi.
Augustine represents the worldview of the Christian West. He
broke with Greek and Roman thought in holding that man is a created
being, entirely distinct from God the Creator. The Christian view of
the church, as a corporate body of believers in Jesus Christ, separate
and distinct from family and state, owes much to Augustine and is of
fundamental importance for social ordering in the Christian West. 2
Two articles by contemporary Chinese authors are particularly instructive in setting forth essential elements of the Chinese worldview
in the context of the use of force in international relations. General
Zhang Junbo and Colonel Yao Yunzhu attribute what they deem to be
a sharp contrast between Chinese and Western decision-making to
differing cosmologies. 3 Professor Shi Yinhong, while not discounting
2

"Church," as used herein, is not a generic term signifYing religious institntions. Nor does it signifY a particular denomination within Christianity. It signifies
men and women who have placed their faith in Christ for salvation and thus form the
corpus Christian!, i.e., the Body of Christ. See. e.g., Colossians I :24; Ephesians
5:29; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31.
3
Zhang Junbo & Yao Yunzhu, Differences Between Traditional Chinese and
Western Military Thinking and Their Philosophical Roots, 5 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 209
(1996).
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Chinese-Western differences, places considerable emphasis on suggested points of similarity, especially as related to the matter of social
. 4
ordenng.
Roberto Unger contrasts China and the Christian West on the bases
of cosmology and social order. 5 Professor Unger's analysis is particularly useful in that it treats the relationship of law and policy generally,
rather than in the limited context of the use of force. Unger contends
that a legal order based on rule of law developed in the West and not
in China because of Western beliefs regarding cosmology and forms
of social order. In the Christian West, law came to be viewed as distinct from policy, with its own institutions, values, and methodology.
Part III analyzes the relationship of law and policy in making decisions to go to war as developed in the West. It demonstrates that the
distinction, and relationship, between law and policy are based upon a
particular Western Christian cosmology and view of social order.
Zhang and Yao assert that the main difference between China and the
West in this regard is that Chinese decisions are based on "justice"
while Western decisions are based on "interest. " 6 Their criticism may
be accurate regarding the pre-Christian and post-Christian West, but it
is not an accurate assessment of the Christian West.
Augustine was perhaps not only the greatest theologian of the
church, but his writings were also seminal for the development of just
war doctrine. Just war doctrine in the Christian West, because of its
foundational worldview, maintains the distinction between law and
policy, thus placing "justice" (law) into proper relationship with "interest" (policy).
PART I- WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WESTERN?

Use of the terms "West" and "Western" can be ambiguous. Several
approaches have been taken in defining "West," each of which is
somewhat helpful, but none of which is totally satisfactory. The simplest approach is to define "West" in terms of longitude on a map.
This approach, however, is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of
cultures that are commonly identified as Western. An approach from
the Cold War era is to identifY East and West based on political differ4

See Shi Yinhong, Chinese and Western Ethical Traditions and International Intervention, 6 REGENT J. lNT'L L. 69 (2007).
5
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, The Chinese Case: A Comparative Analysis. in LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 86-109
(1976).
6

Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at210.

REGENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

94

[Vol. 6

ences, but this approach has become passe with the fall of the Soviet
empire.
The term "Western" is often used to designate cultures originating
in ancient Greece and Rome, developing in Christian Europe, and continuing (with inclusion of certain of its colonial offspring) in modem
Europe. 7 However, it is difficult to discern the logic that justifies placing such disparate cultures as pagan Greece, seventeenth century England, and present-day France under the common designation "Westem."
Another approach to defming Western culture as spanning from
ancient Greece to modem Europe is to treat the Christian era as something of an unhappy parenthesis in history, running from the fall of the
Western Roman Empire to the Renaissance. Victor Davis Hanson
tends toward that approach. 8 At the same time, Hanson identifies certain characteristics common to Western culture, as contrasted with
Eastern cultures, which he believes explain the success of Western
culture in its military clashes with the non-West. 9
Harold Berman identifies "Western" with that part of Europe and
its colonial progeny in which the Western church, in both its Roman
Catholic and Protestant forms, has been dominant during the period of
time from the eleventh century to the present. 10 Although Berman's
identification of "Western" is arguably too restrictive, he makes two
important points for present purposes. First, Western Christian culture
is essentially different from Greco-Roman culture and is not an outgrowth of it. 11 Second, the freedom of the Western church from the
control of civil government and its vitality as a competitive polity,
distinct from state and family, were necessary conditions for the development of the Western legal tradition. 12

7

See generally CARLE CLARK ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CNILIZATION

(1947).
8

See generally VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE
LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN POWER (2001).
9
10

AND

CULTURE:

!d.

HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 14 (1983).
11

See id. at 148-51 (showing that although Western Europeans received or
rediscovered legal texts from the Roman Empire, they transformed the meaning of
those texts in large measure through the application ofthe scholastic method).
12
See id. at 5, 18-19 (explaining that this tradition, though greatly weakened
through the destructive influences of the French and Russian Revolutions, still distinguishes the West from the rest of the world).
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In this article, the term "Christian West" means the period of time
from the fifth to the nineteenth century and covering the territory primarily of Western Europe and certain of its colonial offspring. The
period of time from the nineteenth century to the present is referred to
as the "post-Christian West."
The Christian West begins with the fifth century because it is the
time during which Augustinian theology began its rise to primacy.
Augustine's theology was the most comprehensive, consistently orthodox, and influential of the early church. He made a decisive break
with Greek philosophy, articulating a cosmology that maintained a
distinction between the Creator and His creation, and he laid a foundation for a social order in which the church became a separate institution from the state. 13 Additionally, Augustine first articulated a just
war doctrine based on Christian theology that prevailed in the West
until the nineteenth century. 14 Just war doctrine provides an exemplar
for formulating the relationship between law and policy in the Western
legal tradition.
The post-Christian West began during the nineteenth century when
the legal positivism of John Austin/ 5 built upon the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, 16 began its rise to ascendancy. Law came
to be viewed merely as an instrument of social control, separate from
any objective morality or higher law. Accordingly, Western nations
increasingly viewed the use of force in international relations as based
on interest rather than justice.
Classical international law, as summarized in the works ofGrotius
and Vattel, 17 was premised upon a superintending law of God that
governs nations. Once Austin's definition of law as the command of
the political sovereign was accepted, the basis for international law
was destroyed. In international relations, if there is no political sover13

!d. at 109-10.
!d. at 110.
15
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED passim
(Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Wedenfeld & Nicolson 1968) (1832) (discussing divine
laws, positive law, positive morality, and laws metaphorical or figurative).
16
BHIKHU C. PAREKH, JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 28 (1993)
("Austin was the direct juristic heir of Bentham."); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN
GENERAL(1970).
17
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RJGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE passim (Richard Tuck,
ed. Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1625); EMERJCH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS;
OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS passim (Chicago, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. publ'g
1863) (1775).
14
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eign, logically there can be no law. Without law, the only basis for
conducting international relations is national interest. National interest,
rather than just cause, provides positivists the only 'Justification" necessary for the use of force.
The nineteenth centnry also gave birth to two ideologiesmaterialism and evolution 18---completely at odds with the Christian
doctrine of creation and its Creator-creature distinction. As a result,
the fate of society based on the rule of law, which was distinct from
interest-group politics and utilitarian ethics, was further sealed. The
state's rapid rise to primacy as the most powerful social institution
paralleled the development of non-Christian ideology and legal positivism. The church (as well as the family) became increasingly marginalized, yet it was the church in particular that historically had sustained the Christian worldview and served as a restraint on the state.
PART II- CONTRASTING WORLDVIEWS: CHRISTIAN WEST AND CHINESE

A. Augustine

Augustine is the most influential theologian in the history of the
Christian West. His writings on the doctrine of creation (cosmology)
and "the City of God" (social order) 19 are particularly important for
laying the groundwork for a Christian worldview distinct from that of
non-Christian thought. A particular product of Augustine's worldview
was his formulation of just war doctrine, which was seminal for theology and for international law. It was in the development of the just war
doctrine that the relationship between law and policy, or as Zhang and
Yao write, the difference between 'justice" and "interest," was worked
out.2o
Augustine's articulation of the Christian. doctrine of God the Creator as distinct from man the creature decisively severed the syncretistic
influence that Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, had on Chris-

18

Jonatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 451,463 (2005).
19
The works of Augustine number more than 100 titles, including SAINT
AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (D.W. Robertson, Jr., trans. 1958) (the first 3
books were finished in 396-397 and the fourth book was finished in 426) and SAINT
AUGUSTINE, 11lE CITY OF GOD (Demetrius B. Zerna & Gerald G. Walsh, trans. 1950)
(413-426) (consisting of22 books).
20
Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at212-13.
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tian theology. 21 Augustine is also attributed in large measure with establishing the concept of a strong institutional church that would serve
to counter pagan Greek and Roman notions of an all-inclusive social
order under the governance of the state. 22 His views would further
serve to counter the unitary social order based on the family that
dominated Germanic tribalism and that continued well into the Middle
Ages. 23
A syncretism of pagan Greek philosophy, in its Aristotelian form,
and Christian theology emerged in the church during the high Middle
Ages, largely through the influence of Thomas Aquinas. 24 That syncretism, which forms the basis for modern Roman Catholic thought,25
works to undermine the Creator-creature distinction and provides a
false understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. 26 The
21

2 CORNELIUS VAN TIL, IN DEFENSE OF BIBLICAL CHRISTIANITY: A SURVEY
OFCHRISTIANEPISTEMOWGY 51 (1977).
According to Plato, man is not created in the image of God because there is
no God sufficiently absolute to create man in his own image. In the Platonic
story of creation God looks up to Ideas that are next to him and is conditioned by material that is independent of him. Plato's God does not carry
within him the ultimate principle of unity and diversity, but he is looking
for it. Hence man's knowledge caunot be an impress of God's knowledge.
If God did try to impress his knowledge upon man it would naturally be regarded as an imposition by man because he was more or less God's equal.
Thus Plato and Augustine stand once more opposed to one another.
Id.
22
B.B. WARFIELD, CALVIN AND AUGUSTINE 313 (Samuel G. Craig ed., 1956).
It was particularly in the doctrine of the Church, which [Augustine] thus
took up and transfigured, that he became in a true sense the founder of Roman Catholicism, and thus called into being a new type of Christianity, in
which "the idea of the Church became the central power in the religious
feeling" and "in ecclesiastical activity" "in a fashion which has remained
unknown in the East."
Id (citation omitted).
23
See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 62-68, 226-30 (explaining that tribalism is
still a more powerful force in much of the world than religion or nationalism). See
also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 470.
24
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 246, 279.
25
See C. Scott Pryor, God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural
Law, 22 J. L. & RELIG. 225, 234-35 n.52 (2006-07).
26
CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE REFORMED PASTOR & MODERN THOUGHT 90-91,
96-97 (1974).
Calvin argued that no man can know himself without at the same time
knowing himself as a creature of God. No man can observe the facts of nature and history round about him without seeing clearly manifested in them
the all-controlling and judging activity of the Creator-Redeemer God. Thomas [Aquinas] starts from the abstract concept of Being and introduces the
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Protestant Reformation marked a return to the orthodox theology of
Augustine and has been appropriately viewed as an Augustinian revival.27 The Reformation had implications not only for cosmology but
also for social ordering. Although Western Europe had long been
based on a multiplicity of competing and overlapping jurisdictions, it
was in those countries most influenced by Reformed theology that
jurisdictional boundaries, now largely eroded, were most clearly
drawn between family, church, and state. It was also in those countries
most influenced by Reformed theolo~ that the political forms of republicanism and federalism flourished. 8
1. Created Order

One of the fundamental doctrines that distinguishes Christian
thought from non-Christian thought is the doctrine of creation. Christians believe in creation ex nihilo (out of nothing) by a pre-existing
and eternally self-sufficient God; the created order is not merely an

Creator-creature distinction afterwards. He reduces the Creator-creature
distinction to something that is consistent with the idea of God and the
cosmos as involved in a chain of being, with varying degrees of intensity.
His philosophy and psychology thus make any true Christian theology impossible.
If Thomas, the theologian, hears by revelation that God has created the universe out of nothing and he tells this to Thomas, the philosopher, the latter
will answer that he cannot know this to be the case, indeed that he will
never be able to know such a thing to be so. He must add that the nature of
reality does not allow for any such thing to be so. For surely faith will never
teach anything that is out of accord with right reason, and has God not
given reason to man? Thomas maintains that fuith takes over where reason
cannot go. But what will he do when both ''reason" and "faith" make contradictory statements abont the nature of reality? In other words, the argument with respect to the first mover is an argument about the nature of the
whole of reality that is utterly out of accord with the nature of this reality as
it is said to be in the Christian religion.
!d.
27

VAN Tn., supra note 21, at I 00-0 I.
See generally Herbert D. Foster, International Calvinism Through Locke
and the Revolution of 1688, 32 THE AM. HIST. REv. 475 (1927) (discussing reformed
theology and its impact on political theories of government); DONALD LUTZ, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 86-87 (1988) (discussing why Americans of the founding era believed they were capable of self-government).
28
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extension of God, nor an emanation from Him, nor is it shaped out of
something equally pre-existing or independent of God. 29
The modem attack on the doctrine of creation, led by those who
hold to a monistic cosmology, generally claims to be "scientific" in
nature. Actually, this is primarily a philosophical and theological attack on the worldview that produced the Western legal tradition and
the Western social order. The destructive impact of the modem state's
censorship of "creationism" in public schools is much greater on matters of ethics, law, and social order than it is upon operative biology.
Unless God is prior to, distinct from, and independent of the created
order, He cannot be the lawgiver. In fact, He would be subject to the
same "law" to which man is subject.
The ancient Greeks were presented with the same basic cosmological options as the ancient Chinese philosophers. They had competing conceptions of God as wholly transcendent (like the Chinese
Shang Ti, lord-on-high) or as wholly immanent (like the Chinese
T'ien, heaven). 30 The Greeks, like the Chinese, opted by and large for
the immanent. Cornelius Van Til points out the distinction between
Augustinian Christianity and pagan Greek thought:
[I]t remains to be proved that anyone of the Greeks ever
thought of the universe as God's creation. The term creation is
used, to be sure, but the connotation of the term creation in
Greek philosophy is always determined by the fact that the
29

2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 74 (1950).
A doctrine which was not developed by pagan thinkers, but which was
held by Augustine in common with other Christian writers, was that of the
creation of the world out of nothing by God's free act .... The doctrine of
free creation out of nothing is not to be found in neo-Platonism, if we except one or two pagan thinkers who had most probably been influenced by
Christian teaching. Augnstine may have thought that Plato had taught creation out of nothing in time, but it is improbable, in spite of Aristotle's interpretation of the Timaeus, that Plato really meant to imply this. However,
whatever Augustine may have thought about Plato's views on the matter, he
himself clearly states the doctrine of free creation out of nothing and it is
essential to his insistence on the utter supremacy of God and the world's entire dependence on Him. All things owe their being to God.
!d. (citation omitted).
A myriad of Bible passages present God as Creator, from the first book to the last.
Genesis 1:1 (NIV) ("In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.");
Revelation 4:11 (NIV) ("You are worthy, our Lord and God, to receive glory and
honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they were created and
have their being.").
30
UNGER, supra note 5, at 101-05.
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universe is thought of as having an eternal or semi-eternal existence alongside of the existence of God. And if such is the
creation concept of Greek thought, it is impossible that the
immanence of God in the universe could mean anything else
than a sort of identity with the universe. The God of Greek philosophy is either exclusively deistic or exclusively pantheis-

. 3!
tic.

One logical implication of a worldview in which man and "God"
are one, and equally subject to the laws of the universe, is to assume
the "naturalness" of the social order and customary norms of behavior
(like /i of Chinese culture)32 Although such a worldview might provide some hope for developing universal customs, it does not explain
the existing disharmony or offer a satisfactory way of realizing the
essential oneness that supposedly inheres in reality. Instead, it calls for
reliance upon the wise man or shaman who has more insight into these
matters than others and can explain the universe to us 33 This seems to
track with Zhang's and Yao' s view of "heavenly laws" (tiandao) and
"inner life" (neizai xingming). 34 The "heavenly laws" and "inner life"
have a necessary correspondence because all is one; therefore, the
world can be understood by looking inward. In such a universe, law
can have legitimacy only insofar as all men concur as to what custom
requires.
The other logical implication of a worldview in which man and
God are one is that man and God are equally free to impose their will
upon the universe. Those who have the most wisdom will use law as a
creation of the human will-that is, positive law (like fa in Chinese
culture) 35-to impose an order they choose. Still, law will have legitimacy only insofar as all agree as to what order to establish by means
of positive law.
31

VANTrr.,supranote2l,atl6.
See UNGER, supra note 5, at 93-96.
33
VANTIL,supranote2l, at45.
The conclusion of the whole of Greek speculation was that all things are at
bottom one. Epistemologically expressed, this amounts to saying that there
can be only one type of mind. The human and the divine mind can never
differ in any other way than quantitatively .... The minds of both God and
man are placed within a universe that is larger and more original than, or as
original as, themselves.

32

Id
34
35

Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 216.
See UNGER, supra note 5, at 101-05.
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Those who find themselves under the sway of the positivists' legal
order have no higher law to which they may appeal when they find
their necks under the heel of the positivists' boot. Officials who sincerely desire to do what is right have no certainty of what is required
unless they have the laws of God to guide them. Western liberal society had an ideological basis for a rule of law, but surrendered it while
still claiming allegiance to the rule oflaw. 36
The question is whether the West can maintain a legal order based
on the rule of law without maintaining the faith that sustained it. 37 The
answer is no. Western society has retnrned to the type of legal system
that marks Chinese society. The only appeals are to custom and force.
There is no higher law with which to question the legitimacy of custom or stand in judgment of the sovereign's command.
2. Kingdom of God
In The City of God, Augustine gives the reader a panoramic view

of human history and depicts the scene as a battleground between two
ethical realms, the City of God and the City of Man. 38 Although the
City of God is to extend over the entire earth and many of its citizens
are civil rulers, it is not to be equated with a political entity having
universal jurisdiction. Some citizens of a particular nation are citizens
of the City of God, and some are not; even families have diverse citizenship, some members being citizens in the City of Man and some in
the City of God.
The City of God is not to be equated with the Christian church; although, hopefully, most people in the visible church are also citizens
of the City of God. 39 The implications for social ordering are mani36

See id. at 166-81 (stating that "liberal society" is that form of organization
characterized by multiple social groups and rule of law based in a religion of transcendence).
37
Id. at 83. Unger asks:
What happens when the positive rules of the state lose all touch with a
higher law and come to be seen as nothing more than the outcomes of a
power struggle? Can the ideals of autonomy and generality in law survive
tbe de1nise of the religious beliefs that presided over their birtb?
Id
38
18 AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 413-26 (Marcus Dods trans., Great
Books ed., Encyclopredia Britannica 1952) (n.d).
39
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 109 ("Contrary to what is sometimes supposed,
St. Augustine did not identify the City of God with the Christian Church as such, nor
did he identify the Earthly City with the Roman Empire or with the state in general.").
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fold. The church does have a unique mission that is separate and distinct from the family and the state. The church alone has a universal
mission in the geographic sense, but its jurisdiction is limited in terms
of the governmental powers it exercises. The church has primary responsibility for extending the City of God by making disciples of all
nations, baptizing, and teaching people the laws of God, 40 yet it does
not stand in a hierarchical relationship of superiority to the state and
family.
The state has been given the authority to use force, but that power
is not able to make nations embrace democracy or some other ideology, change people's lives, or convict individuals of the truth. The
territorial jurisdiction of the state is also limited. In the City of God,
the family and church have separate jurisdictions from the state. 41 Not
only is there a multiplicity of states, there is a multiplicity of groups
within society. The church does not rule over family or over the state;
the family does not rule over church and state. The state does not absorb family and church as was the case in the pre-Christian West and
is the tendency in the modern post-Christian states.
After the Papal Revolution in the eleventh century, the Christian
West developed a basic social order distinct from Eastern Christendom. In the great struggle known as the Investiture Controversy, the
Western church asserted, and was able to effect, the independence of
the church from the state. 42 That fission of church and state, not to be
confused with modern notions of the separation of God from state, was
the catalyst for a number of other developments that further separated
Western and Eastern Christendom. 43 Most importantly, for present
purposes, the church in the West provided a model and a catalyst for
the development of the rule oflaw in the civil realm. 44

40

Matthew 28:18-20 {NIV).
Then Jesus came to them and said, "All authority in heaven and on earth
has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,
and teaching them to do everything I have commanded you. And snrely I
am with you always, to the very end of the age."

Id
41

42

43
44

AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 515, 519-522.
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 87, 97-99.
AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 520-21.
See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 99-119.
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3. Just War
Augustine's writings on the topic of the law of war are of continuing and particular relevance. Just war doctrine, as developed in the
Christian West, also demonstrates how the Christian worldview sustains the proper relationship between "justice" and "interest," or between law and policy. The theological basis for just war doctrine and
the resulting relationship between law and policy is developed in Part
III, below, comparing the Augustinian or Christian West view of just
war and making decisions to use force in international relations, with
those of the non-Christian West. As demonstrated in Augustine's view
of just war, only a Christian worldview can sustain the rule oflaw.
B. General Zhang Junbo and Colonel Yao Yunzhu
In their article, "Differences Between Traditional Chinese and

Western Military Thinking and Their Philosophical Roots," Zhang
Junbo and Yao Yunzhu identity what they believe are the primary differences between Chinese and Western approaches to the use of force
in international relations. 45 In so doing, they have identified the fundamental philosophical differences between China and the West and
the two basic approaches to ethics generally.
Zhang and Yao claim that the focus of Chinese decision-making
regarding the use of force is ')ustice," whereas the focus in the West is
national "interest." 46 Another way of stating the difference is that for
the Chinese it is a question of law and morals, whereas for Westerners
it is a question of policy and expediency.
It is true that since the nineteenth century, Western discussions regarding the use of force have focused on national interest. The formulation and promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine is an excellent
example. 47 National interest may also have been the focus of decisionmaking in the pre-Christian West as the authors claim. However, what
the authors term the ')ustice" approach appears to be roughly equivalent to just war doctrine, which was predominant in the Christian West
from the fifth through the eighteenth centuries.
The authors, while exploring differing approaches to the use of
force, identity Chinese and Western philosophical and cosmological
differences that account for those differing approaches. Although they
45

46
47

Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 209-10.
Id. at209.
See infra Part III.

104

REGENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6

do not directly address differences in social order, the basic cosmological differences that they do address have direct implications for the
type of social order that became dominant in China.
1. Justice v. Interest
Zhang and Yao write: "In a very broad sense, Chinese traditional
military theories place more emphasis on upholding 'justice' while
Western theories focus on the gaining of 'interests.' This may be best
demonstrated by the different approaches each takes in thinking and
explaining the causes as well as the aims of war."48 "Justice" corresponds to law and "interest" to policy. Zhang and Yao portray the decision to go to war as being made on one basis or the other. 49 They cite
historical examples from Chinese literature in which war is waged to
"punish the immoral," "uphold the ethical codes, that is, courtesy, justice, loyalty and commitment," and "for 'the purpose of stopping tyranny and getting rid of a dictator. "'50
Most of Zhang and Yao' s illustrations of the Western approach to
war are drawn from Greek authors. It is unclear whether their defmition of "West" includes the Christian era from the fifth through the
eighteenth centuries. It was during that period that Augustine formulated and Christendom developed just war doctrine. 5 1 The classic treatises on international law adopted just war doctrine whole cloth.
If Zhang and Yao mean to include the Christian West in their use
of the term "West," their assertion that the West tends to approach war
on the basis of interest must be modified. Granted, it may be that even
those in the West who profess or claim to act on the basis of 'justice"
rather than "interest" really act on the basis of interest alone. Zhang
and Yao acknowledge the same phenomenon in Chinese history-the
claim of justice is often a pretense for interest. 52 Even if the Christian
48

Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 210.

49

!d. at 211.

By and large, the ancient Chinese held disputes over moral issues as the
most important factor in causing war while ancient Greeks and Romans
stuck to interest conflicts when explaining the war ferment. ... [O]ne can
hardly find any assertions in the huge number of Chinese history books stating that material gains were legitimate aims of war.... [W]hat one con-

stantly comes across in those books is the condemnation of such assertions.
!d.
50

51

!d. (citation omitted).
JOHN MARK MATTOX, SAINT AUGUSTINE AND THE THEORY OF JUST WAR 1-

2 (2006).
52

Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 211.
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West has acted on the basis of interest in some cases, Zhang and Yao
fail to acknowledge that these actions were contrary to the West's
moral and legal position.
2. Inward Focus on the One v. Outward Focus on the One
Zhang and Y ao correctly assert that the modem, non-Christian
West focuses on interest rather than justice. However, they fail to recognize the essential unity of Chinese and non-Christian Western cosmology and social order, a unity more fundamental than the points of
difference. The differences that do arise between Chinese and postChristian thought in the West are due in part to the limited success of
the modem West in its effort to rid itself of the Christian worldview.
Neither Chinese philosophy nor non-Christian Western philosophy can
provide the foundation for operating on the basis of justice rather than
interest because they reject the belief in a created order distinct from
God.
Zhang and Y ao describe what they believe are the fundamental
philosophical differences between China and the West from which the
differing approaches to war rise. But the Chinese and non-Christian
Western differences in cosmology are not as essential as the similarities. The authors provide a summary of the basic Chinese view of reality, or "cosmology":
A central task of ancient ethical philosophy in China is to
inspire people to cultivate the good in their nature and to discard the evil. It holds that the "heavenly laws" (tiandao) which
refers to the natural law or even more broadly to the objective
universe, is fundamentally in conformity with "inner life" (neizai xingming) which means human nature .... By looking introspectively into his own mind, he can gain a better knowledge of the heavenly laws. And by constantly cultivating and
improving himself, he can compromise with nature and reach
the ultimate harmony [of the human nature and heavenly
laws]. 53
In this basically pantheistic cosmology, there is no essential difference between man and the rest of reality, and man looks inward to
discover what is around him. The authors contrast the Chinese ethical
philosophy, which inspires people to look inward, with what they be53

Id at 216.
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lieve is traditional Western philosophy. Westerners, they believe, approach natnre in a very objective manner failing to view man and nature as an organic whole. 54
Even assuming the general validity of the distinctions that Zhang
and Yao draw, it is important to ask if there is something much more
basic that Chinese philosophy shares with non-Christian Western philosophy than the differences they note. It may be true that Chinese
philosophy generally looks inward and views the universe as a whole,
but this is not wholly unlike many major schools of Western philosophy and theology that have an inward focus and view all reality as essentially one. The Realist schools of Western philosophy, both ancient
and modem, have viewed universals, as opposed to particulars, as ultimate. 55 Like the ancient Greeks, most Western philosophers since
Descartes, including Kant and his offspring, have had an inward and
subjective focus. Kant also had a major influence on modem theology.
That influence includes, most notably, the theology of Schleiermacher
(Protestant liberalism), Karl Barth (Protestant neo-orthodoxy), and
several modem Roman Catholic theologians who are closer ideologically to Eastern philosophy than to orthodox Christianity. 56
Both Chinese and non-Christian Western cosmology view all being as one. 57 There is no Creator-creature distinction as there is in
54

Id
Western philosophers have followed a different path studying the relationship between man and nature. Their understanding of nature is more
scientific and materialistic .... Instead of focusing on the inner world, they
seek answers from solid facts in the outer world .... Unlike ancient Chinese who have looked upon man and the universe as an organic whole, an-

cient Westerners treated them as two distinctive systems. They tended to
approach nature in a very objective manner, explaining it as it is and using
it to their own benefit.
Id
55

See 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPlEDIA BRITANNICA 974 (15th ed. 1994).
See VAN TIL, supra note 21, for a thorough and incisive treatment of ancient Greek and European philosophers and their legacy, which resides in modern
Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians. He summarizes: "Protestantism has in
effect returned to the bosom of the mother church even as the theologians of the
church have in effect marched forward with the theologians of neo-Protestantism
toward an alliance with modern subjective philosophy." Jd at 223.
57
Compare FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO 24 (1981)
("The term humanism ... means Man beginning with himself, with no knowledge
except what he himself can discover and no standards outside of himself. In this
view Man is the measure of all things, as the Eulightemnent expressed it.") and
56

CHARLES MORRIS, THE PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 7 (1970)

("The major pragmatists all accepted the view that man emerged as one kind of liv-
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Christian thought. Both Chinese and non-Christian Western thought
presuppose a basic cosmological monism. Whether man starts by
studying himself or the world surrounding him, and whether he does
so for the purpose of conforming to the world or manipulating it, man
ultimately is the only interpreter of the world, and ultimately interprets
it only for his own benefit. Man, then, is the interpreter of reality, and
his own interest is his only end. He has no ability to transcend his
situation and make moral judgments. Nothing exists for him besides
nature, with which he is essentially one.
3. Ambiguity v. Precision
One of the problems with Chinese philosophy is that its basic cosmological monism carries over into ethics. Chinese ethics are much
less rule-oriented than Western ethics. Language need not be precise
because ethics are based on relationship, not rules. Such concepts as
ying and yang further break down conceptual and moral distinctions.
Although Zhang and Yao do not directly address the issue of social
order, they show how Chinese philosophy and its equivocal concepts
work to obliterate distinctions between social groups.
[The Chinese] way of thinking tends to be ambiguous and
equivocal in defming concepts and establishing categories.
However, it is just the ambiguity and equivocality that make
philosophical concepts flexible and all-inclusive .... For example, ying and yang (the negative and the positive) are two
opposing philosophical concepts which might be contradictory,
complementary, interchangeable and so on.... Further, ying
can transform into yang and yang into ying. ... In short, the
all-inclusive ying and yang may be presented as a series of relationships between orthodox and unorthodox (qi and zheng),
toughness and softness (gang and rou), superiority and inferiority (qiang and rag), offensive and defensive wong and shou),
emptiness and fullness (xiu and shi) and so on. 5

ing being within a long evolutionary process.") with MINTA C. WANG, THE
ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE THOUGHT: PAST AND PRESENT 36 {1983) ("Tao is 'the

source of creation' or the source of all beings. It existed before the universe and gave
birth to all things that constitute the universe .... The goal of the Taoist is 'to be one
with the Tao,' to be in harmony with the order of nature.").
58
Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 220.
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Zhang and Yao argue that, in contrast to the ambiguity that exists
in the Chinese way of thinking, Westerners focus on definitions and
analysis 59 Zhang and Yao view Chinese ambiguity or lack of precision as a strength in waging war because it provides flexibility and
facilitates deception. 60 In actuality, it creates more problems than it
solves. If ying and yang_is the basic dynamic in the universe, it is impossible to make ethical judgments between right and wrong. The authors are thus unable to make any moral judgment about Western values and behavior. The distinction between ')ustice" and "interest"
would become meaningless since even opposites become identical. If
true, the ying-yang dynamic would remove the ability to carry on any
meaningful dialogue since people could never be sure that anything
they identified by language would remain the same.
Lastly, any basis for trust, even among friends or apparent friends,
would be lost. With ying and yang as essential principles, one has no
way of differentiating between the treatment due friend and foe, assuming people could distinguish friend from foe. A basic cosmological
monism leads to sociological monism, eliminating the distinction between society and the state, the multiplicity of groups, and ultimately,
the individual. If people attained harmony with the heavenly principle,
they would have no need for social distinctions. If people's interests
were perceived as the same, they would have no need for multiple
groups or for a distinction between law and policy.
Zhang and Yao are mistaken in their assessment that China and the
West have fundamental philosophical differences. At the most basic
level, China and the non-Christian West are fundamentally alike. Their
worldviews leave no alternative to an ethics of war based on anything
other than interest.
C. Professor Shi Yinhong

Where General Zhang and Colonel Yao focus on differences between Chinese and Western philosophical thought, Professor Shi identifies what he believes are points of similarity in worldview. 61 At the
same time, he notes great diversity in particular ethical norms. He il59

Id. ("The West adopts the methods of abstract logical analysis and systematic deduction in its philosophical thinking. In their thinking process, Western philosophers try to define every concept, category and proposition precisely and explicitly. Every hypothesis has to be exactly defined, logically analyzed and convincingly
proved.").
6o
Id.
61
Shi, supra note 4, at 70-71.

2008]

CHINESE AND WESTERN WORLD VIEWS

109

lustrates those differences with examples arising in Chinese-Western
relations, particularly since 1949. 62 His article focuses on the task of
formulating common ethical principles upon which China and the
West may agree for purposes of military intervention, and in so doing
he raises critical issues regarding social ordering.
Shi believes that a similarity exists in the Chinese principle of
"heavenly principles" and the Western notion of "law of nature. " 63 He
also finds similarity in the Chinese ideal of "universal empire" and the
Western medieval belief in the universal church. The first similarity
relates to cosmology, while the second similarity relates to social order.
1. Heavenly Kingdom and the Law of Nature

The similarity that Professor Shi fmds between the Chinese principle of "heavenly kingdom" and the Western notion of "law of nature"
is rooted in a universal human nature. 64 But he gives no indication that
human nature is fundamentally distinct from God the Creator or anything else in the created order.
Therefore, on the one hand, most or even all nations or civilizations in the world share certain fundamental ethical beliefs,
expressed by such terms as the traditional Chinese "tian-li"
(heavenly principles) and the Western "law of nature." On the
other hand, civilizations have important differences in various,
more concrete ethical norms, moral practices, and ways of
normative judgments; they indicate a very rich ethical diversity.65

62

Id.at 71-72, 80-84.
Id.at 70.
64
Id.at 70.
Ethical tradition is probably the most characteristic aspect in the cultural
tradition of a nation or a civilization. Similarly, moral norms are probably
the most meaningful notions regarding social arrangements and human behavior. Those ethical beliefs not only indicate the ideal, passion, rationality,
and even the impulse for interests which exist in human nature (and therefore exist as well in the particular nature of any individual as a member of
any nation or civilization), but they also reflect the various kinds of basic
objective elements which determine their living enviromnent and conditions
for thinking.
Id (citations omitted).
65
Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
63
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Professor Shi 's identification of "tian-lz"' (heavenly principle) with
the West's "law of nature" minimizes essential differences between
the two.
It is necessary to distinguish between the use of the term "law of
nature" before and after the European Enlightemnent. Prior to, and
even during the Enlightemnent, "law of nature" was a term used in
orthodox Christian legal and political theory in the West to denote the
sum total of laws imposed by God the Creator on man and the rest of
the created order. 66 Christian theology, and corresponding legal and
political philosophy, clearly distinguished between Creator and creature, maintaining a fundamental cosmological dualism in the universe.67
Although Enlightemnent Deism did not jettison God, it began to
treat the law of nature as independent of him. With the ascendancy of
naturalistic materialism, "natural law" became further divorced from
the God of Enlightemnent Deism to the point of dispensing with the
personal God as known in Christianity. 68 The "law of nature" as used
in the Darwinian sense became very similar to the Chinese "heavenly
principle," both presupposing a fundamental cosmological monism..
Law is thus simply something that inheres in being, and, lacking the
Creator-creature distinction, all being is one. The East and nonChristian West meet in their agreement regarding the fundamental nature of the universe.
2. Universal Empire and Medieval Church
Shi addresses, although briefly, the issue of social order. In so doing, he suggests that the Chinese ideal of universal kingdom is ani66
67

See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARJES *39-40.
CORNELIUS VAN TIL, PAUL AT ATIJENS 5 (1978).

Basic to all the thinking of the Greeks was the assumption that all being is at bottom one, that all change comes by way of some form of emanation from that one being and is therefore ultimate as the One, and that
somehow all the ultimate multiplicity that exists as due to ultimate change
again ultimately returns to the One ....
But Paul knew that on the contrary, all men at bottom know God, the
Creator. All men know that they are creatures of God, that they are law
breakers. At bottom they know that their own systems, according to which
God cannot exist, are rationalizations by means of which they seek to suppress the fact of their responsibility as creatures of God.
!d.
68

UNGER, supra note 5, at 92.
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mated by the same spirit as the ideal of universal Christendom and
even Western liberal intemationalism. 69
The nature of the similarity between the Chinese universal empire
and medieval Christendom that Shi describes is vague. Shi recognizes
that a distinction should be made between the Christian West (the
Christendom of medieval Europe) and the non-Christian West (Westem liberal intemationalism). 70 In fact, the difference is great. The
Christian vision of universal kingdom includes a multiplicity of independent nations. Universality does not mean a single centralized political authority, nor should it be equated with the universal church.
The church is only one of several institutions within universal Christendom (along with the family and the state), with each institution under God and law. 71 China and the non-Christian West view universal
order as an all-encompassing centralized political entity, ruling, of
course, with benevolence. 72 The post-Christian West's visions of unity
are universal in scope and political in nature, eliminating jurisdictional
distinctions. That is a totally different vision of universality from that
held in Christian orthodoxy.
3. Justice or Interest
Shi recognizes custom (/i) as deriving from a basic harmony of nature and man, which men realize by looking inward. 73 That was central
to the Confucian vision of society. In contrast, the Chinese Legalist
School had a different vision of legal order, one based on power, corresponding to the positivist view of law (Shi calls it "liberal") that
69

Shi, supra note 4, at 71.
In the field of international affairs, we see on the Chinese side the tradi-

tional ethics of "Hua-xia zhi jiao" (Chinese universal precepts), "wang-dao''
(kingly way), and "li-jiao" (indoctrination of proper manners), which are
probably the same in spirit as the ethics of medieval Enropean Christendom, and to a certain degree, the Western liberal internationalism of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.:.
!d.
70

ld. at 71.
See 2 CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1211-22 (John T.
McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westroinster Press 1960) (1559) (discussing
the chnrch's limited jurisdiction); Id. at 1485-90 (discussing God's appointroent of
civil government); see a/so AL1MAN K. SWIHART, LUTHER AND THE LUTHERAN
CHURCH: 1483-1960, at 153-59 (1960) (discussing the high estate of marriage and
family).
72
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 54-55 (Garrett Ward Sheldon
ed., 2001).
73
Shi, supra note 4, at 70-73.
71
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arose in the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 74 Legal
positivism began its rise to predominance in the West during the nineteenth century. 75 Austin defmed law as the command of the political
sovereign. 76 Because there is no international political sovereign, there
can logically be no such thing as international law. Relations between
states will thus be governed purely by politics. Military force is perhaps the ultimate political instrument. Therefore, post-Christian Westem nations developed a legal-political worldview that justified imposing their will on less developed nations with no limitations other than
national interest. Shi recognizes the role of power politics in China
originating in the Legalist School in the Age of the Warring States. At
the same time, Shi emphasizes that China has historically suffered at
the hands of Western powers pursuing policies based on interest that
conflicted with just war ideology. He states that Chinese behavior beginning with Mao's ascendancy to power can be understood only in
light of the effects on China and other nations of the lack of legal restraint on Western intervention in the affairs of developing nations. 77
Despite these historical abuses against China, Shi would like to find
some justification for limited intervention in the modem world upon
which China and other great powers can agree.
Shi recognizes that positivism applied to international relations is a
departure from the Christian Western view of law. Classical international law, reflecting the Christian West's legal tradition, did not recognize the right of armed intervention in foreign states and did recog-

74
75

!d. at 71.
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM Thl AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2

(1998).
76

AUSTThl, supra note 15, at 11, 13.
Shi, supra note 4, at 71.
At the same time, however, Chinese history also contains an ethics of
power politics which originated from the Legalist School in the age of Warring States. These ethics are similar in basic tenets, ways of thinking, and
emotional appeals to the realist ethics described or advocated by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and even Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. In
contemporary China, what most strongly influenced, or even dominated, the
international behavior of China in the three decades after 1949 was the international ethics of the Chinese Communists in Chairman Mao's generation. Contemporary China, which originated from modern Chinese national-

77

ism, was indignant from endless humiliations suffered in modern times, despite being a great ancient civilization, and from Marxism.
!d. (citations omitted).
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nize the equality of all states? 8 The principles of non-intervention and
equality of states have been adopted in part by international organizations/9 but the United Nations Charter scheme compromises these
principles because certain powerful countries, most notably the permanent members of the Security Council, have potentially expansive
powers of military intervention.
On the other hand, Shi notes that Western powers have often operated solely on the basis of national interest while claiming compliance
with internationallaw. 80 Shi discusses the West's failure to abide by
its own just war tradition based on natural law. 81 He does not note,
however, that the West's failure to abide by just war tradition relates
to a basic shift in jurisprudence that took place as England and the
United States moved from a Blackstonian view of law to the utilitarian
view championed by Bentham and Austin. The Blackstonian view of
78

BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1146-48
(3rd ed. 1999).
79
Shi, supra note 4, at 76.
[T]he principle of the equality of states, whether powerful or weak (with its
related ban on the great power intervention), seem much more in accord
with the modern ethical traditions of the West. These principles can be said
to originate from the ancient and powerful notion of natural law, which
constitutes one of the core norms of modern international law and ethics.
These ethics were molded and spread all over the world by the West and
were embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of
the United Nations, which were wholly or largely drafted by Westerners
(especially the British and Americans).
Id
80
!d. at 76-77.
81
!d. at 76-77.
However, since the Vienna Congress in the early nineteenth century, the

great Western powers have also formally and repeatedly set up great power
privileges and have made these privileges legitimate through international
law. They rely on their superior power and justifY their actions by their particular roles in the international society. In international political practices,
the Western powers have frequently bullied, humiliated, and intervened
against the weak states and nations in the name of loose and ambiguous
wgreat powers' responsibilities." For example, Theodore Roosevelt's re-

sponsibilities of "international police" and also "world leadership" have
been asserted by every U.S. President since the end of World War II. However, neither the great powers' formal privileges nor those rights derived
from their self-granted responsibilities have any legitimacy in the sense of
morality. Further, those actions are not in accord with the most fundamental
ethical traditions of the West itself unless one unreasonably regards the
"might is right" logic declared by the Athenian generals at Melos as such a
tradition.

Id
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law, in both its domestic and international applications, was based
upon the Christian view of law given by God, the Creator, who is distinct from His creation. 82
In the nineteenth century, Darwinian evolution declared the death
of Christian cosmology and its distinction between the Creator and the
creature. At the same time, legal positivism spelled the death of the
rule of law based upon neutral principles that had their origin outside
human political power. 83 The United Nations is not an outgrowth of
the medieval notion of a universal church. It is a vision of very different origin arising out of the death of rule of law and the demise of a
God distinct from His creation.
Like Zhang and Yao, Shi notes quite candidly thatChina has often
acted on the basis of interest in the same manner as the West. 84 The
main problem with Shi's analysis is that, although he recognizes that
China and the West have numerous particular conflicting ethical
norms, he indicates that they share fundamental views about the created order, society, and the nature of law. He realizes that China and
the West must come to a consensus on particulars, and has even devised a set of ethical criteria to employ in resolving intervention issues. Unless he establishes a satisfactory ground for deriving particular
ethical standards, however, his approach will also dissolve into little
more than shared political interests.
D. Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger
In Law in Modern Society, Professor Roberto M. Unger compares
and contrasts several non-Western legal systems, including the tradi-

82

BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, *39, *41.
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws
of his creator, for he is an entirely dependent being.

This law of nature, being co-eval [existing at the same time] with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are
valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
!d.
83

Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries!legal-positivism/.
84
Shi, supra note 4, at 71,73-76.
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tiona! Chinese, with the Western legal order. 85 He believes that a necessary relationship exists between ideology, social order, and particular concepts of law. 86 Ideology includes religious belief and issues addressed above as cosmology. Unger's analysis is particularly compelling, in part, because his book is not an apology for the religion, social
order, or concept of law that characterizes what he calls Western "liberal society." 87
A major purpose of Unger's study analyzing the differences between Western and non-Western legal systems is to explain why "legal
order" arose only in the West. Professor Unger uses the term "legal
order" in a way that is roughly synonymous with "rule of law" and
"Western legal tradition." For Unger, a central characteristic of legal
order is the distinction between law and politics.
Unger identifies three distinct types of law: customary, bureaucratic, and legal order. 88 He distinguishes bureaucratic legal systems
from customary systems in that bureaucratic law is positive (written
and not merely based on ~ractice) as well as public (within the province of the state to make). 9 China experienced a struggle between parties who wanted to maintain a system based on customary law and
those who wished to establish a bureaucratic system. In China, the law
of the customary order is called li, and that of the bureaucratic order is
called fa. 90
Legal order has in common with bureaucratic law the features of
being positive and public. But legal order is characterized by two additional features that distinguish it from the bureaucratic orderautonomy (law is distinct from politics in terms of substance, institutions, methodologies, and professions) and generality (law applies uniformly and neutrally to all). 91
Unger believes that legal order arose in the West alone for two reasons. First, a cosmology-a religion of transcendence--developed in
the West that recognized a distinction between God as the Creator and
His creation. Second, the West's social order has been characterized
by multiple groups competing for influence and power 92 The interplay
of its particular ideology (which includes its religion) and social order
85
86
87
88

89
90
9l
92

See UNGER, supra note 5, at 86-126.
ld at 66-86.
Id at 166-81.
!d. at 48-52.
Id at 50.
See id at 93, 102.
!d. at 52-55.
!d. at 66.
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resulted in legal order. Unger does not make these connections to
show that China, or other cultures, are inferior to the West or that
these cultures should attempt to develop legal order. Rather, his aim is
to convince the reader that change comes not incrementally but by
bounds through the synthesis of concurrent changes in ideology and
social order.
Unger believes that the ideology of transcendent religion simply
serves to justify the social order 93 That is, with its deceptive claim of
neutrality, legal order becomes a powerful tool that dominant groups
use to legitimate their position in society. Belief in the rule of law
serves to legitimize the exercise of political power.
1. Inunanence v. Transcendence

Unger asserts that religion of a transcendent God is a necessary
condition for the development of legal order. 94 China never developed
a religion of transcendence. China had two competing views of God
but preferred immanence over transcendence.
With respect to the image of the supreme deity, the most important trend was the increasing characterization of divinity as
T'ien (heaven) rather then Shang Ti (lord-on-high). As a result,
the notion of deity became more impersonal and naturalistic.
The wavering of early Chinese religion between the quest for
transcendence and the commitment to immanence was definitively resolved in favor of the latter. ... [N]either Confucianism or Taoism, nor the later Buddhist theology, allowed a
marked separation of God and world. Consequently, none of
the many forms of ancient Chinese religion viewed the world
as something made by God according to a design that could be
at least partially apprehended by the human mind. 95
Christianity maintains a clear distinction between the Creator and
His creation. The Creator reveals certain truths about the world and
imposes obligations on man. As a consequence, moral judgments
made in conformity with divine law have a claim to neutrality that
binds all men. Law is more than the imposition of one group's inter-

93
94
95

!d.
!d.
Id. at 99-100.
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ests on others. Law is justice. Law accords with divine reason and is
not simply the triumph of human will.
2. State and Society
Another necessary condition, in Unger's mind, for the development of legal order is a social order based upon group pluralism. 96 In
China, ecclesiastical and familial institutions, and even the individual,
were subordinated to, or subsumed in, civil authority. 97 Unger asserts
that religions of immanence tend to justify the given social order and
provide no vantage point from which to critique it. 98 Change is therefore unlikely unless a competing vision of social order is introduced
from outside. The social order of China exists in marked contrast to
that of Europe.
In China, religious learning was put at the service of govern-

ment and most ritual functions were performed by the rulers
themselves or, in the case of ancestor worship, by the household heads.
Whatever the reasons for religious naturalism and for the
weakness of ecclesiastical bodies in ancient China, the impact
on polity and law was enormous. It became impossible to develop the view that nature and society are governed by universallaws of divine making. Another consequence of the Chinese
religious evolution was the absence of a doctrine and of a prophetic or priestly tradition that might have operated as an effective check on governmental power. Lastly, the lack of a conception of the relationship between a personal God and the
unique souls made in His image denied theological support to
beliefs that could have emphasized the independence of individuals from one another or from the groups and societies to
which they belonged.
. . . [I]n Europe science and political philosophy alike
started off from the idea of universal principles; government
had to contend with the conception of God-given natural laws
and with powerful churches; and religious belief emphasized

96

97
98

Id. at 66.
See id.
!d. at 95.
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the capacity of individuals to transcend their social circumstances just as their Creator transcends His creation. 99
... Legalists [in their struggle with the Confucianists] on
the contrary, wanted nothing more than to extend the powers of
govermnent. ... Consequently, traditional bodies like the extended family, the village, or the guild should be stripped of
most of their powers, their tendency to develop centers of authority checked, and all men equalized by the fear of the ruler
and his agents. The imposed order of the state would replace an
imaginary natural order of society. 100
The Christian West developed distinct institutions of family,
church, and state. 101 It eventually developed a social order in which
none of those institutions was preeminent except within its allocated
sphere or jurisdiction. In early Germanic Christian culture, the family
had certain preeminence over the civil and ecclesiastical order. 102 The
church was eventually able to assert its independence from the family
and the civil order. Unfortunately, the church attempted to bring the
family and state into a subordinate or dependent relationship with the
church. In large measure, control over the family was effected through
the doctrine of marriage as a sacrament. 103 Through Gregory VII's
Dictatus Papae, the eleventh century church claimed the power to depose civil rulers. 104 An eventual compromise between church and state
ensured the independence of the church. In the post-Christian era, just
as in the pre-Christian era and in Chinese society, it is the state that
asserts its supremacy over, or even subsumes, all other social groups.
3. Justice and Interest
The Confucianists and Legalists fought for dominance in China. 105
Though they offered competing visions of law and society, in some
99

100
101
102

!d. at 100-0 I.
Id. at 107-08.
See BERMAN, supra note 10, at I.
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 422-45, 462-476; BERMAN, supra note 10, at

52, 61, 82.
1m
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 476-95; JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT
TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 16-41
(DonS. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997).
104
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 95-99.
105
UNGER, supra note 5, at I 06.
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sense they faced the same predicament-that of being unable to legitimize their respective visions. Lacking a religion of transcendence,
Legalists were never able to justify their bureaucratic laws as something other than the will of the strongest. 106 The Confucianist view of
society was based on generally accepted custom. As the Chinese people increasingly came into contact with other cultures they realized
that social customs are established in large measure by convention and
not the natural order of things. With this growing realization and increasing disintegration of consensus they were quite vulnerable because they had no religion of transcendence to provide a means of
ideological legitimization of existing custom. 107
Unger argues that "Western liberal society's" distinguishing trait is
its coincidence of transcendental religion and group pluralism giving
rise to legal order. 108 Unfortunately, he believes that the religion of
106

Id. at 102-03.
Above all, governments struggled to bring an ever broader range of social
activities under their control and guidance; to politicize what had previously
been accepted as part of the self-regulating order of society.

[T]he fa [bureaucratic-type laws] were positive; they were made rules. The
tendency to write them down and publicize them calls attention to the more
basic premise that the laws arise from the human will rather than from a
pattern underlying the reciprocities of social life. The need for positive law
was a byproduct of the process described earlier as the disintegration of
community. In a setting of rapid dissolution of the established rank system
and of the shared values and insights with which that system was bound up,
it became increasingly more difficult to rely on custom.
!d.
107

Id.at 108.
Thus, the Confucianists accepted and reinterpreted the li [customary standards of conduct] of the feudal age as the way to resolve the conflicts
among and within individuals that had become rife during the transformation period. They argued that the fa, as coercively imposed positive rules,
affected the symptoms rather than the causes of social ills. Because they
disregarded the true basis of social harmony, such rules could lead only to
greater dissension.
Id. Berman notes that it was Christianity as developed in the West that "broke the
fiction of the immutability of the [Gerrnauic] folklaw." He further notes:
Gradually, between the sixth and the eleventh centuries, Germanic law,
with its overwhelming biases of sex, class, race, and age, was affected by
the Christian doctrine of the fundamental equality of all persons before
God: woman and man, slave and free, poor and rich, child and adult. These
beliefs had an ameliorating effect on the position of women and slaves and
on the protection of the poor and helpless.
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 65.
108

UNGER, supra note 5, at 66.
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transcendence is a myth used to legitimize a social order based on
domination by the most powerful. The solution to social problems, he
deduces, does not lie in perfection of the given system of laws, much
less in preaching of the gospel with its consequent regeneration of individuals and establishment of Christian institutions.
For Unger, the God of Augustinian Christianity does not exist, or
at least has not spoken; thus, a value-neutral legal order is not possible.
All "law" is merely the imposition of interest; in fact, law cannot exist.
All is politics; therefore, man must quit playing law and play better
politics. The difficulty for Unger is that, in order for political decisions
to have legitimacy, the decisions must be equally in everyone's best
interest. In short, the world must operate on a principle of global unanimity.
PART III- JUST WAR DOCTRJNE

109

A. Introduction

The distinction and relationship between law and policy is seldom
more consequential than in making decisions to go to war. Just war
doctrine identifies two basic types of judgment that must be made before going to war. no The first type is legal in nature, and the second
type is prudential.ll 1 To use the terminology of Zhang and Yao, there
is a ')ustice" component and an "interest" component. Classical international law treatises adopted the elements of Christian just war doctrine and maintained the distinction between the legal and the prudential elements.
Even when customary international law became severed from its
overtly biblical and theological moorings, it nevertheless maintained
the concept of just cause that is the central element of just war doctrine. Because classical, customary international law remained firmly
established in the pre-Enlightenment "natural law" school of jurisprudence, lawyers never viewed the law as simply a matter of human
convention. Properly understood, customary international law reflects
the immutable law of nature, which is the law of God. 112 For that rea109

Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True, 13 DICK. J.
lNT'L L. I (1994). Part III of the present article is taken in large measure from that
article. However, that article focuses equally on customary international law, the
U.N. Charter scheme, and the U.S. Constitution.
IIO
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONOUCTOF JUST AND LIMITED WAR27 (1981).
111
!d.
112
VATIEL, supra note 17, at !viii.
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son, the Western notion of customary international law must be distinguished from the Chinese notion of customary law (li). Similarly, the
relationship that policy bears to law in the Christian West distinguishes policy judgments from Chinese bureaucratic law (fa).
The fact that a nation has just cause, however, does not mean that
it should wage war. The decision to wage war entails both a legal
judgment that just cause exists, and a prudential or policy judgment
that war is in the national interest. A prudential judgment is founded
largely on utility. Not only must the state have a legal right, it must be
advisable and expedient to exercise that right. It would be contrary to
just war doctrine and, therefore, immoral to wage a war contrary to
national interest even if just cause exists. Emerich de Vattel, the
premier eighteenth century international law jurist, described the distinction between law and policy:
The reasons which may [cause] [states] to [wage war] are of
two classes. Those of the one class shew [sic] that [a state] has
a right to make war,-that [a state] has just grounds for undertaking it: -these are called justificatory reasons [legal judgments]. The others, founded on fitness and utility, determine
whether it be expedient for the sovereign to undertake a war,
-these are called motives [prudential judgments]. 113
Classic just war doctrine developed over the course of a thousand
years, beginning with Augustine and cuhninating with the Spanish
theologian and lawyer, Franciscus De Victoria. 114 Augustine addressed
all of the basic issues and set the framework for discussion that continues to this day. Theologians, knights, canon lawyers, and civil lawyers worked within that framework developing details and making
applications.ll5 Occasionally, they made significant departures from it,
most notably in the practice of holy war. The elements of just war are
just cause, right authority, right intention, proportionali?; of ends, last
resort, reasonable hope of success, and the aim of peace. 16
113
114
115

Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
TuomaIa, supra note 109, at 48.
See generally FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE

AGES (1975) (outlining the development of early just war theory); JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND
SECULAR CONCEPTS 1200-1740, at 26-80 (1975) (explaining late medieval just war
theory).
116
James Turner Johnson, Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Application: The Moral Significance of the Weinberger Doctrine, in THE RECOURSE To
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Some scholars have asserted that former Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger's criteria 117 for the employment of U.S. combat
forces overseas are basically those of just war doctrine. 118 They claim
that the Weinberger criteria correspond directly to the just war criteria
as follows:
Just War
1. Just cause
2. Right authority

3. Proportionality of ends

4. Reasonable hope of success
5. Last resort
6. Right intention

7. End of peace

Weinberger Doctrine
1. Vital to national interests
2. Support of American people
and their elected representatives
3. Continual assessment of objectives and forces committed
4. Clear intention of winning
5. Last resort
6. Clearly defmed political and
military objectives
7. (Implied in 1 and 5) 119

While elements of just war doctrine and the Weinberger Doctrine
appear to be similar, there is a fundamental dissimilarity between the
two doctrines that looms far larger than any similarities. The Weinberger Doctrine is a compendium of only prudential or policy considerations.
From the U.S. Department of Defense's perspective, the Weinberger criteria provide some very important prudential guidelines for the
use of force, and, in that sense, they are limiting factors. 120 However,
if the Weinberger Doctrine was meant to be a comprehensive list of
criteria for the national decision to use force, it is severely wanting.
The central role that the Weinberger Doctrine has played in U.S. foreign policy certainly bolsters General Zhang's and Colonel Yao's as-

WAR: AN APPRAISAL OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE 81,87 (Alan Ned Sabrosky &
Robert L. Sloane eds., 1988) [hereinafter Just War Thinking].
m
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Remarks to the National
Press Club: The Uses of Military Power (November 28, 1984), in CASPAR W.
WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE: SEVEN CRITICAL YEARS IN THE PENTAGON
433, 441-43 (1990). The six criteria listed in his remarks have become known as the
Weinberger Doctrine.
118
Just War Thinking, supra note 116, at 86.
119
Id. at 100-01.
120
Weinberger, supra note 117, at441-43.
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section that decisions to use force in the West are based on "interest"
rather than ')ustice."
B. Elements ofJust War
1. Just Cause

The Classic Formulation of Just Cause. Augustine is considered
the foremost expositor of just war doctrine, although he did not describe it systematically at any one place in his writings. He wrote that
wars to avenge injuries are just. 121 Later writers described with more
specificity what it means to avenge injuries. Gratian's A Concordance
of Discordant Canons (1140), 122 the first and perhaps greatest systematic compilation and treatment of canon law, held that nations may use
force to defend themselves, to exact compensation, and to punish. 123
These same bases were accepted by the civil lawyers of Medieval
Europe. 124 In fact, civil authority's very reason for being is to serve as
God's agent of justice, punishing criminals and exacting compensation
for injuries. 125 Sanctions are based on the existence of fault, and war is
seen as an extraordinary form of lawsuit to vindicate justice. 126 The
underlying wrongs and remedies available are closely analogous to
those in a domestic legal system. This threefold purpose for the use of
force is perfectly reflected in the international law treatises of Vattel
and Grotius.

121

AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 515. See also RUSSELL, supra note 115, at

18.
122

BERMAN, supra note 10, at 14347.
See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 60-68. Thomas Aquinas quotes Augustine
as authority for defining just cause: "A just war is usually described as one that
avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make
amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly." THOMAS AQUINAS, II THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 578 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Encyc1opredia Britannica, Inc. ed., 1952).
124
See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 137-38. In medieval times, civil author123

ity's very existence was to serve as God's agent of justice punishing criminals and
exacting compensation for injuries. Thus, canon lawyers, theologians, and civil law-

yers all shared the same perspective, namely that their authority was derived from
God and the Bible. See, e.g., Romans 13:4 (NN) ("For he [the civil ruler] is God's
servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the
sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the
wrongdoer.").
125
Romans 13:14.
126
MATTOX, supra note 51, at 46.
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In assessing just causes for going to war, the classic legal scholars

determined that the legal cause of every just war is an injury done to
one nation by another. Because injuries include any unlawful attacks
or other violations of rights identified by international law, the kinds
of injury giving rise to just cause are extremely numerous. 127 As a result, three just and lawful objectives exist for which nations wage war:
(1) obtaining compensation or reparations for losses; (2) punishing
offenders by reprisal for wrongs done; and (3) defending against
unlawful attacks. 128 Nations attain the first two objectives by resorting
to offensive war and the third by waging defensive war. Following a
fmding of just cause, nations may lawfully wage offensive war as a
sanction to exact compensation for injuries and to punish for
wrongs. 129 On the other hand, nations may wage just defensive war
without such fmdings in the event of an unlawful attack. 130 Because
there is no superior tribunal before which nations may bring charges or
complaints, they must necessarily be the judges of their own cases. 131
Holy War Distortion of Just Cause. During the medieval period,
some nations attempted to expand the bases of just cause to include
waging holy war. They justified holy war on the sole basis that others
did not share the same religious beliefs. Religious differences, even in
the absence of other wrongs, were treated as just cause for war. 132 The
goals of conquest and conversion thus became lawful. This theory was
used in part to justify the Carolingian conquest of Europe and the medieval Crusades in the Middle East. 133 However, Pope Innocent IV and
the canon lawyer, Hostiensis, denied the right to make war on Muslims or other pagans merely because they were unbelievers. 134
Holy war doctrine in Christian theology seems to have been laid to
rest by Franciscus De Victoria in the sixteenth century. His treatise,
De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones, the first modern treatise on international law, rejected the justification of religious differences for

127

VATTEL, supra note 17, at 302.
Id. Hugo Grotius listed the same three objectives of just wars: "Justifiable
causes include defense, the obtaining of tbat which belongs to us or is our due, and
tbe inflicting of punishment." HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 171
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646).
129
MATTOX, supra note 51, at45-47.
130
VATTEL, supra note 17, at 302.
131
!d. at 301.
132
RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 195.
133
Id.
134
See id. at 195-212.
128
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war against the American Indians. 135 In fact, Victoria argued for the
Indians' right to fight against Christian nations in self-defense. 136
The Secular Holy War Distortion. Holy war notions are not unique
to religious thought. Cicero approved of wars waged to impose the
ideals of Rome. 137 In the last two centuries, the "secular" counterpart
to holy war has been war based on ideology. A common theme in most
of these wars is that conquest is for the good of those who suffer under
an inferior religious, social, or political order.
The assumption that law and force can make people good, or free,
or responsible, or whatever else they are lacking, is false. The same
rationale that would justify the use of force for establishing democracy
would justify using force for establishing the whole panoply of human
rights. If world peace and, therefore, national interest depend on universal adherence to democracy and practice of human rights, there are
no just-cause limits left on the decision to make war. 138 The purpose of
war limited to just cause is to return the wronged party to the status
quo ante bellum and not to use war as an occasion to establish some
new social order. Therefore, under traditional international law, the
right of humanitarian intervention is extremely limited. It allows for
the rescue of one's own citizens, or perhaps others, from a foreign
state without its permission.

135

See generally FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI
REFLECTIONES 163-78 (Ernest Nys, ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Institute
ofWashington 1917).
136
Id at 129-49, 171.
137
BERNARD T. ADENEY, JUST WAR, POLITICAL REALISM, AND FAITH 24-27
(1988).
138
President George H.W. Bush's Ambassador to the Organization for American States defended Operation Just Cause (1989 invasion of Panama), designed to
topple Manuel Noriega, with a display of that kind of optimism and fervor for warfare usually associated with religious ideology:
There are times in the life of men and of nations when history seems to take
charge of events and to sweep all obstacles from its chosen path. At such
moments, history appears to incarnate some great and irresistible principle,
such as the nation-state in the 17th century, nationalism in the 19th_century,
and decolonization in the middle part of this century.
Today, we are once again living in historic times, a time when a great
principle is spreading across the world like wild fire. That principle is the
essence of the democratic form of government. It is an idea which has, in
this decade, and especially in the historic year-1989-acquired the force of
historical necessity.
Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.H.R., 2d Sess. at 2,
Doc. No. 127 (1990).
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President George W. Bush increasingly appealed to a version of
secular holy war over the course of the war in Iraq. 139 The justification
offered for the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq-to stop the
threat of a collusive alliance between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein
launching a nuclear attack on the United States-was stated in just war
terms. Once it became clear that the existence of nuclear weapons and
an Al-Qaeda-Saddam alliance could probably not be established, the
justification changed. President Bush began to proclaim that the war is
about exporting democracy and liberty, the promise being that Baghdad would become something of a Middle Eastern "City Built Upon a
Hill," insEiring surrounding Islamist nations to become free and democratic. 40
The unjust-regime basis of justification for invading Iraq should be
unhesitatingly rejected. The belief that the hearts and minds of Middle
Eastern peoples will be won through force of arms and implementation
of a variety of state sanctioned socio-economic programs and the tragedy it portends has a recent historical analogue-Vietnam. 141 In essence, President Bush's justification is the promotion of a messianic
139

See Joe Klein, The Courage Primary, TIME, June 25, 2007, at 39, 39; Kenneth T. Walsh, History's Verdict, U.S. NEW & WORLD REP., Jan. 29,2007, at 28,2930 (noting that Bush has characterized the opposition as "evildoers" and spoke of an
"ideological conflict" in the 2006 State of the Union address).
140
See George W. Bush, President, U.S., Second Inaugural Address {Jan. 20,
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0l/20050120l.html (stating that the U.S. encourages democratic reform in other countries and
"America will walk at your side").
141
Two U.S. Senators who are veterans of the Vietnam War have different
recollections of the reasons for U.S. involvement in that war. Senator James Webb,
former Secretary of Navy during the Reagan administration, believes that the war in
Iraq, not the war in Vietnam, is the first war the U.S. has fought to advance an ideology. Senator Webb stated concerning the war in Iraq, "The foreign policy of this
administration [that of President George W. Bush] has been taken over by people
who would do something we've never done in our history, and that is to attempt to
export our ideology at the point of a gnn." Chris Jenkins, Reagan Navy Secretary
Enters Race to Challenge Sen. Allen, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at B04. Senator
John Kerry, former Presidential candidate, believes the Vietnam War was also
fought to promote an ideology. Senator Kerry has said,
I believe very deeply that it was a noble effort [American involvement in
the Vietnam War] to begin with. I signed up. I volunteered. I wanted to go
over there and I wanted to win. It was a noble effort to try to make a country democratic; to try to carry our principles and values to another part of
the world.
Interview by Tim Russert with John Kerry, Senator, U.S., on Meet the Press: Interview with Senator John Kerry (NBC television broadcast May 6, 200 I), available at
http://hnn.us/articles/3552.html.
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VISIOn in which America has universal jurisdiction to bring down
kingdoms and raise up others. In his second inaugural address, President Bush stated,
Advancing these ideals [human rights and self-government] is
the mission that created our nation. It is the honorable
achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of
our nation's security, and the calling of our time.
So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in
the world.
Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world:
All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the
United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your
oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand
with you.
When the Declaration of Independence was first read in
public and the Liberty Bell was sounded in celebration, a witness said, "It rang as if it meant something." In our time it
means something still. America, in this young century, proclaims liberty throughout all the world, and to all the inhabitants thereof. Renewed in our strength-tested but not wearywe are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of
freedom. 142
The last paragraph of the second inaugural address contains an allusion to the inscription that appears on the Liberty Bell, "Proclaim
liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." 143 It is
a quote from Leviticus which refers to the Year of Jubilee, a time when
captives were to be set free. 144 President Bush is mistaken: Christ, not
Bus h, supra note 140.
USHistory.org, The Liberty Bell, http://www.ushistory.org/libertybelll
index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
144
Leviticus 25:10 (NIV) ("Consecrate the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty
throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It shall be a jubilee for you; each one of you
is to return to his family property and each to his own clan."). Jesus commenced his
public ministry by reading the prophecy from Isaiah 6 I: I -2 regarding the Year of
Jubilee. He then claimed that he had that day fulfilled that scripture.
142
143
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Caesar, sets people free. The triune God acts through His people, the
church, giving them jurisdiction to tear down and raise up kingdoms,
not through force of arms but through the proclamation of the Gospel.145 When placed on trial before Pontius Pilate, Jesus made it very
clear that the kingdom He established would not be established by
military force. 146 The root problem of conflict in the Middle East, as it
is in every other place in the world, is not political bondage but spiritual bondage. 147 Because it is not a conflict fought against flesh and
blood, it can be won only by spiritual means entrusted to the church. 148
The state is neither commissioned nor equipped to deal with that kind
of enemy. The state's jurisdiction and power are limited.

The spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to preach good
news to the poor.
He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery for the
blind,
To release the oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.
Luke 4:18-19 (NIV).
145
Luke I :51-53 (NIV). Mary prophesied regarding Jesus while he still in the
womb:
He has performed mighty deeds with his arm;
he has scattered those who are proud in there inmost thoughts.
He has brought down rulers from their thrones
but has lifted up the humble.
He has filled the hungry with good things
but has sent the rich away empty.
!d.
1
""
John 18:36 (NIV) ("Jesus said, 'My kingdom is not of this world. If it were,
my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jews. But now my kingdom is
from another place."').
147
John 8:31-36 (NIV).
To the Jews who believed him, Jesus said, "If you hold to my teaching,
you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth and the truth will
set you free."
They answered him, "We are Abraham's descendants and have never
been slaves of anyone. How can you say that we will be set free?"
Jesus replied, "I tell you the truth, everyone who sins is a slave to sin.
Now a slave has no permanent place in the family, but a son belongs to it
forever. So if the son sets you free, you will be free indeed."

Id
148

Ephesians 6:12 (NIV) ("For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but
against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and
against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.").
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2. Right Authority
Most classic scholars based international law on the sovereignty of
nation-states. 149 That basis has been seriously questioned beginning in
the past century. Vattel took a strong stand that international law included preexisting and immutable laws of nature. 150 Although he did
not argue that the law of nature required multiple nation-states, he certainly implied it in the title of his treatise: The Law of Nations; or,
Principles of the Law ofNature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns. 151 Thus, under a legal framework as revealed
in Scripture, it is arguable that the delegation to the United Nations of
the right to use force is not only unworkable and imprudent, it is
unlawful as a violation ofjus cogen. 152
The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) scheme assumes that
nations are free to delegate the authority to wage offensive war to an
international organization. 153 It is arguable that the attempted delegation of authority to the United Nations is itself a violation of classic
just war doctrine.
Since at least 1945, with the creation of the United Nations, there
has been a radical departure from customary international law. The
provisions of the U.N. Charter governing the use of force differ from
customary law in two ways. First, the U.N. Charter attempts to monopolize the offensive use of force, thereby denying states that right. 154
Second, the U.N. Charter permits United Nations-sanctioned force on
grounds that are far more expansive than states are permitted under
customary law. 155 The U.N. Charter does not limit the United Nations
to defending states and enforcing judgments for legal wrongs. Rather,
149

David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty
Transformed? in THE GWBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 162 {2003) available at
http://www.polity.co.uk/globaVpd£'GTReader2eHeld.pdf.
150
VATTEL, supra note 17, at lviii.
151
!d.
152
The term jus cogen is found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. It means "peremptory norm" or fundamental norm. Some interpret it to be a
natural law principle because it may not be altered by treaty or custom. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
153
U.N. Charter art. 39 & 43.
154
I d., art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting threats, and therefore, declarations of war);
id., art. 51 (recognizing individual nations' right to resort to use of force only in self
defense against armed attack).
155
Jd., art. 39 & 42 (establishing Security Council privilege to use force); id.,
art. 55 (declaring that observance of human rights is a necessary condition for
peace).
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it allows the United Nations to secure peace by imposing a particular
vision of social, political, economic, and ideological order that it perceives to be in the global interest. These two facts place the U.N.
Charter outside the pale of both customary international law and the
just war doctrine.
Although Professor Shi acknowledges that the U.N. Charter
scheme gives special privileges to the great powers (i.e., members of
the Security Council) and justifies armed intervention, he approves of
it but wants to protect against abuses. 156 Apparently, he thinks there is
common ground between East and West because he analogizes the
mission of the United Nations to the ancient Chinese principle of
heavenly kingdom and the Western vision of universal Christendom.
But the U.N. Charter scheme is not of the same lineage as Augustine's
vision of the universal church. At best it is mimicry.
Medieval writers did not specifically address the question of
whether a nation may delegate its sovereign right to exact justice by
engaging in offensive war to an international organization. However,
the issue is not totally novel. The medieval writers had a host of biblical and historical materials to draw upon if they were to directly address the matter. For example, Augustine's The City of God is replete
with appeals to Scripture and history. In that work, Augustine gave a
theological explanation for man's sin and resulting wars. He dealt specifically with the biblical account of the Towel of Babel, in which God
created a multiplicity of nations and spread them over the earth as a
limitation on man's attempt to create a single political order to replace
the Kingdom of God. 157 Augustine depicted Christ's earthly kingdom
as comprised of a multitude of peoples, families, and languages. The
church under the headship of Jesus Christ and His law provided the
overarching basis for unity amongst a plurality of nations and families.158 As seen through Augustine's examples, biblical Christianity
holds that a multiplicity of nations with limited jurisdiction is a necessary limitation on political, social, and economic evil.
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Shi, supra note 4, at 82-88.
supra note 38, at 425. See also Genesis 10; Genesis 11:1-9;
Deuteronomy 32:8 (NIV) ("When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance,
when he divided all mankind, he set up boundaries for the peoples according to the
number of the sons of Israel."); Acts 17:26-27a (NIV) ("From one man he made
every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he determined the
times set for them and the exact places they should live. God did this so men would
seek him.").
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AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 491.
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AUGUSTINE,
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Augustine also contrasted the Kingdom of God, which has universal jurisdiction, with several other ancient empires, which made illegitimate claims to universal jurisdiction. The Christian worldview
holds that a multiplicity of nations with limited jurisdiction was instituted by God as a limitation on political, social, and economic evil. 159
Augustine's view is a direct contradiction to the new-world-order assumptions embodied in the vision of the United Nations. 160 The underlying premise of one-world government schemes is that a multiplicity
of nations is the cause of evil rather than a limitation upon it.
The medieval writers further debated whether, among Christian
rulers, the Holy Roman Emperor alone had the authority to wage offensive war. Eventually, a consensus arose that lesser officials did
have that right, but it remained difficult to determine at what level the
right resided in the civil hierarchy. 161 In any event, the Emperor was
unable to monopolize force then, just as the Security Council is unable
to monopolize force today.
3. Proportionality of Ends
It is difficult to determine whether the requirement that the ends of
a war be proportionate to the means is a legal requirement or a prudential one. Both options are probable. In either case, the requirement
serves as a limiting factor on the use of force. If a decision is made to
use force, it must be proportionate to the wrong done. Under the view
that force is used to vindicate justice, punishment should be based on
just desert 162 and compensation for injury suffered. Proportionality is a
159

Acts 17:6.
Augustine based his view on the biblical passages from the prophet Daniel.
Daniel 2:44 (NIV) ("In the time of those kings, the God of heaven will set up a
kingdom that will never be destroyed, nor will it be left to another people. It will
crush all those kingdoms and bring them to an end, but it will itself endure forever.")
From chapters 7-11 of Daniel, it becomes clear that the four kingdoms mentioned in
the second chapter of Daniel were Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, and ancient
Rome.
161
See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 138-55.
162
The theory of just desert combines the ideas that criminal punishments must
be something that the criminal deserved and that the punishment is more fair if it is
of a determinate rather than indeterminate duration. "[T]he goals of incapacitation
and retribution carne to dominate, and in some quarters completely supersede, the
goals of rehabilitation and deterrence in the minds of politicians and social theorists." Hugo Adam Bedau, Punishment, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005) available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/punishment/.
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necessary corollary of the just cause element and is probably implied.
These same principles are applicable to sanctions in a civil court proceeding.
Proportionality is used, in another sense, as a prudential consideration that focuses on the impact of war on a state's own citizens. It asks
whether the costs of exacting justice exceed the benefits to be gained
by waging war. 163 The cost in life and resources of prosecuting a war
may be so great, or an injury so small, that it is better to forego the
wrong. Pursuing a matter by force is often unjust, not to the wrongdoer, but to the nation's own citizens.
4. Reasonable Hope of Success
The element of reasonable hope of success is clearly prudential in
nature. 164 In fact, it seems to be a restatement of proportionality in the
prudential sense as outlined above.
5. Last Resort
Last resort is primarily prudential and relates closely to proportionality and reasonable hope of success. War is always costly and full
of uncertainty. Therefore, nations are morally bound to pursue all
peaceful means of settlement. This also ensures fairness to the other
party. There is one legal component of this element which is a requirement of both international and U.S. domestic law: a declaration
of war. 165 Because declarations of war identify the just causes and are
issued by lawful authority, they relate to elements one and two, above,
as well.
AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 169. According to O'Brien:
To begin with, the ends held out as the just cause must be sufficiently good
and important to warrant the extreme means of war, the arbitrament of
arms. Beyond that, a projection of the outcome of the war is required in
which the probable good expected to result from success is weighed against
the probable evil that the war will cause.
O'BRIAN, supra note 110, at 27. There seems to have been little development or
even recognition of this issue through most of the medieval period. However, the
Bible counsels kings to make sound judgments concerning war. See, e.g., Luke
14:31; Proverbs 24:6.
164
O'BRJEN, supra note 110, at 27-28; AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 316-18.
165
.
.
AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 316-18. C1ting Deuteronomy 20:10, Aqumas
argued that declarations of war are a fundamental requirement of God's law binding
all nations. !d. In the medieval period the context of discussion of declarations of
war focused more on the issue of who had authority to initiate war. See RUSSELL,
supra note 115, at 63, 64, 89.
163
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6. Right Intention
Even if all the above criteria were met, Augustine believed that
one wages war unjustly if he does so out of hatred or other improper
motives. 166 It is also important to check the nation's motives; wrong
motives often lead to a breach of the external requirements.
7. End of Peace
The end of peace is another prudential concern. Peace is the supreme purpose for which war is waged. 167 By doing justice, the magistrate sets conditions for peaceful relationships. It is one of the measures of success and also an important component of intention; therefore, it might be included under either of those elements. Peace is not a
mere cessation of fighting. Theologically speaking, peace is reconciliation between enemies. 168 While satisfaction of justice does not
necessarily bring about reconciliation, it is a necessary objective con.. ,
. . . 169
drtlon ,or reconcr1ratiOn.

C. The Weinberger Doctrine
The main difference between just war doctrine and the Weinberger
Doctrine is that the latter is a list of prudential criteria only. In fact, the
whole Weinberger list can probably be subsumed under the element of
"national interest." All of the other elements are particular considerations that guide decision-makers in promoting the national interest.
Weinberger's approach is very much like that of the nineteenth
cenrury German military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, whose writings
on war have enjoyed a modem resurgence of popularity within the
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See AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 175-76; AQUINAS, supra note 123, at
578. Aquinas wrote that there are three elements of just war: (I) lawful authority; (2)
just cause; and (3) right intention. The element of right intention entails several of
the elements listed in this article. Aquinas, quoting from Augustine, states, "[t]rue
religion does not look upon as sinful those war~ that are waged not for motives of
aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the good." !d. Properly waged, a just war is in the best interest
of the offender as well. !d.
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AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 517.
168
See id. at 519.
169
Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Christ"s Atonement as the Model for Civil Justice, 38
AM. J. JURJS. 223 (1993).

134

REGENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6

Department of Defense. 17° Clausewitz asserted: "We see, therefore,
that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a
continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What
171
remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means."
Under modem theory, war is simply a prudential or political instrument whose distinguishing trait is violence. 172 Such a theory purports that war is used first and foremost to serve the national interest,
regardless of how that political interest is defined. 173
That view compliments the "national interest" approach to decision making. Under that view, one only need ask whether it is in the
national interest that democracy will be promoted, terrorists deterred,
human rights protected, prices on oil lowered, or political stability established. If the answer is affirmative, and the objectives cannot be
achieved by peaceful political intercourse, the use of force is "legitimized." This view does not ask whether a legal wrong has been committed. The only limitation on an action is whether the political costs
outweigh the expected benefits. At this juncture, Zhang's and Yao's
criticism ofthe West as based on interest is well-founded. The application of this view, Shi writes, caused the humiliation of China and resulting distrust of the West. 174 It would hardly be surprising to find
that many other countries harbor similar fear, distrust, and resentment.
D. Law in Support ofPolicy

A critical issue that underlies an analysis of just war doctrine is the
relationship between law and policy. Great powers are perceived by
others, and perhaps themselves, as acting solely on the basis of national interest with bare deference paid to legality. This is the view
that China has of the West and under which Shi states that China has
repeatedly received such humiliating treatment. 175 This highlights a
fundamental problem-the perception that law and sound foreign policy are incompatible. Compliance with law is seen as an impediment
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See Anthony F. Sidoti, Abstract, The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, AIR & SPACE POWER J., Jan. 21, 2004,
http:i/www.airpower.rnaxwell.afmillairchronicles/cc/sidoti.html.
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CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Pare! trans.,
1976) (1832).
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Id
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Weinberger, supra note 117, at 440-43.
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Shi, supra note 4, at 70-73.
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!d. at 70-73,76-77.

2008]

CHINESE AND WESTERN WORLD VIEWS

135

to policy implementation and as a severe handicap when dealing with
other nations not similarly encumbered.
The proper relationship between law and policy can be demonstrated in considering the familiar adage that "honesty is the best policy." This adage entails several assumptions. The first is that immutable standards of conduct exist, which are based on something other
than expediency. The second is that doing what is right is not simply
compatible with policy; it is the first step in sound policy decisionmaking. Finally, this adage assumes a view of reality in which compliance with the dictates of right conduct guarantees the attainment of
true self-interest. The same should be said about law-"legality is the
best policy." Of course, this analysis assumes that there are immutable
and knowable standards of right and wrong and that they form the basis of the legal system.
The medieval just war writers and the great commentators on customary international law did not have the theoretical problem of the
incompatibility of law and policy. As God is the Creator of all men
and the author of law, law applies to all people for all of time. These
writers believed that there are immutable principles of divine or natural law revealed to men and nations. Consequently, justice is inseparable from sound policy, and a breach of justice is never expedient or
sound policy. That belief presupposes that positive law and policy decisions are made in the context of, and in conformity to, a law order
and superintending will that rules over nations and the affairs of men.
It is the Christian's-including the Christian statesman's-assurance
that compliance with law is always the best policy.
The extreme tension between the demands of law and policy is a
product of legal positivism. Law, for the positivist, is nothing but one
more political instrument to achieve policy objectives or to engineer a
particular social or world order. When the legal instrument proves ineffective, nations resort to more expedient means. What begins as an
implementation of policy by positive law becomes, as Clausewitz argued, an extension of policy by military force. 176
The legal positivist lives in a world of his own making in which
nothing is a given. He chooses both the ends of the social order, and,
through political and social experimentation, the best means of achieving those ends. Law is not right or wrong; it is simply effective or ineffective as an instrument of political and social control. That strikes the
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very heart of the Western legal tradition and the blessings of freedom
which it birthed.
PART IV- CONCLUSION

A sharp contrast exists between Chinese and non-Christian Westem worldviews on one hand and the Christian worldview as articulated in this article on the other. This contrast is vividly illustrated in
the Apostle Paul's confrontation with the non-Christian Western philosophers in Athens. 177 They told Paul that he had brought strange
teachings to their ears. 178 Paul proclaimed to them that all men and all
nations are created by God and subj.ect to judgment according to laws
which govern all men and nations. 1 9
Although peoples of the geographic West may have been among
the first to embrace these truths, men everywhere will fmd a basis for
unity amongst their diversity of families and nations, not in their
common humanity, but in their union with Christ Jesus. 180 He promised that "[p]eople will come from east and west and north and south
and will take their places at the feast in the kingdom of God." 181 Because God is the Creator of all men and nations, even the smallest and
most scattered of nations can place their hope in His law, which is
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Acts 17:16-34.
Acts 17:6-8.
179
Acts 17:24-31; See also BERMAN, supra note 10, at 63 (showing that the
Germaoic tribes, though geographically western, had a similar difficulty in grasping
178

the implications of a cosmology of creation, even after their "conversion" to Christianity).
In general, Christian beliefs and practices had a great appeal to Germanic
man. They brought him, for the first time, a positive attitude toward life and
toward death, a larger purpose into which to fit the tragedies and mysteries
of his existence. Beside Christianity the old pagan myths seemed harsh and
bleak. One can sense the passion in King Alfred's words, in the famous
"Addition" to his translation of Boethius, "I say, as do all Christian men,
that it is a divine purpose that rules, and not fate." At the same time, the
Christian cosmology and the Christian ethic were not easy for Germanic
man to grasp. If taken seriously, they threatened to undermine not only his
former system of beliefs but also his entire social order.
ld. Berman believes that Eastern Orthodoxy is closer to first millennium Germanic
Christianity than it is to second millennium Roman Catholic and Protestant theology
in terms of impact on social institutions, which perhaps explains the weak development of rule oflaw and constitutionalism the further east one travels in Europe.
180
See Galatians 3:26-29.
181
Luke 13:29 (NIV).
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common to all, 182 and which wovides the standard of justice for judging disputes between nations. 83
Additionally, God has established a plurality of social groups including the family, the church, and the state, each with its separate
jurisdiction, but each operating under God's law. To families, He has
given jurisdiction to raise and educate children, engage in economic
activities, and provide for the needs of their members. 184 To the
church, He has given the keys of the kingdom of heaven that men everywhere might hear and receive the message that salvation is through
faith in Christ alone and that they might be tau&ht the truths of Scripture and its application to every area of life. 18 To the state, He has
given the power to establish civil government. 186 God had a purpose
for establishing a plurality of civil jurisdictions. He did this "so that
men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him
though he is not far from each one ofus." 187
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Isaiah 42:4.
Isaiah 2:4 (NIV) ("He [God] will judge between the nations and will settle
disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their
spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will
they train for war anymore."). This near-universal hope for international peace is
expressed in tbe statne titled, "Let Us Beat Swords into Plowshares." Ironically, tbat
statne sits in a park adjacent to tbe United Nations complex in New York City. Perhaps more ironic still is the fact that tbe statne was a gift of tbe Soviet Union in
1959.
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